Abstract-With the increasing number of antennae in base stations, there is considerable interest in using beamforming to improve physical layer security, by creating an "exposure region" that enhances the received signal quality for a legitimate user and reduces the possibility of leaking information to a randomly located passive eavesdropper. This paper formalizes this concept by proposing a novel definition for the security level of such a legitimate transmission, called the spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP). By performing a theoretical and numerical analysis, it is shown how the antenna array parameters can affect the SSOP and its analytic upper bound. While this approach may be applied to any array type and any fading channel model, it is shown here how the security performance of a uniform linear array varies in a Rician fading channel by examining the analytic SSOP upper bound.
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I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the proliferation of wireless communications, there is a strong need to provide improved level of security at the physical layer to complement conventional encryption techniques in the higher layers. Since Wyner established the wiretap channel model and showed the possibility of approaching Shannon's perfect secrecy without a secret key [1] , this has been since extended to various channels, such as non-degraded discrete memoryless broadcast channels [2] , Gaussian wiretap channels [3] , fading channels [4] , [5] and multiple antenna channels [6] - [8] .
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TWC.2016.2633351 largely ignored, presumably as users are often assumed to be randomly distributed. With the aid of the stochastic geometry theory, the distribution of the random users' locations can be modeled via Poisson point process (PPP), [9] , [10] thus encouraging the utilization of location in wireless security. For example, ArrayTrack [11] shows how improving granularity can be used to enhance security [12] . In [13] - [15] , a location-based beamformer utilizes user's location to enhance security, which does not require user's full channel state information (CSI). This paper mainly investigates the security threat posed by a particular adversarial behavior, i.e., passive eavesdropping, with the classical model where the transmitter (Alice) wishes to transmit to the legitimate user (Bob) in presence of PPP distributed eavesdroppers (Eves). Alice is equipped with antenna array and performs beamforming to enlarge the difference between Bob's and Eve's channels. Beamforming has been shown to achieve the secrecy capacity in multipleinput-single-output (MISO) channels [6] , [7] and has provoked a lot of research [16] , [17] . Essentially, it is a spatial filter that focuses energy in a certain direction or suppresses energy in other directions [18] , thereby allowing secure or insecure locations to be distinguished for transmission to Bob. This is important as many applications require security inside an enclosed area, such as different zones in an exhibition hall or different assembly lines in a factory.
In this paper, we consider the scenarios that only Bob's location information is available at Alice, as explained in [13] - [15] .
In our previous work [19] , [20] , beamforming was used to create an 'exposure region' (ER) to protect the transmission to the legitimate user. However, the ER in [19] and [20] is not based on information-theoretic parameters and lacks theoretical analysis. In this paper, the ER is defined by the physical region where any PPP distributed Eve causes secrecy outage to the legitimate transmission in a general channel model, i.e., Rician fading channel. Then, the spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP) is defined for ER-based beamforming, which measures the security level of the legitimate transmission based on the ER; this enables an investigation of the role of the array parameters, e.g. number of elements and the direction of emission (DoE) angle, on physical layer security.
Related work has attempted to create different sorts of physical regions to combat the randomness of both Eve's location and of the fading channel, e.g., [21] - [23] . Whilst the term 'exposure region' was coined in [21] , it referred 1536-1276 © 2016 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
to received signal quality instead of secrecy outage and lacked information-theoretic analysis whereas in other work, [22] , [23] , the antenna array is overlooked in the informationtheoretic analysis. Since beamforming is performed via antenna arrays, the ER created using beamforming is highly related to the array parameters and can be controlled by changing the array parameters which in turn, affects the SSOP.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• Definition of the new term called SSOP which is based on the ER where randomly located Eves cause secrecy outage and which measures the security performance in the fading channel from a spatial perspective and links with array parameters; it can be applied to existing research by providing information-theoretic analysis and enhancing security performance by taking array parameters into consideration; • A general expression of the upper bound for the SSOP is obtained to facilitate the theoretical analysis of the security performance, applicable to any array type and fading channel model; a closed-from expression of the upper bound for the SSOP is derived for the uniform linear array (ULA); • Based on the SSOP, the first investigation of the security performance of ER based beamforming with ULA in a Rician fading channel with respect to the array parameters is presented. Numerical results reveals that in general, the SSOP increases dramatically as Bob's angle increases; when the number of elements in the array increases, the SSOP converges to a certain value depending on Bob's angle. As for the upper bound, the numerical results show that it is tighter for a smaller number of elements. The paper is organized as follows. The related work to physical layer security from the physical region perspective is surveyed in Section II. In Section III, the system model and channel models are demonstrated whereas in Section IV, the ER is established, based on which the SSOP and its analytic upper bound are derived. The SSOP for the ULA and for the Rician channel are analyzed in Sections V and,VI respectively, along with the tightness of the upper bound. In Section VII, the conclusions are given.
II. RELATED WORK
Whenever Alice has knowledge of Bob's CSI or location information, beamforming can be used to enhance the received signal quality around Bob and reduce the possibility of leaking information to Eve. As Eve's CSI and location information are generally unknown to Alice, this requires the creation of a physical region either based on the traditional performance metrics, e.g., received power or signal-to-interferenceplus-noise ratio [21] , [24] - [28] , or information-theoretic parameters, such as secrecy outage probability (SOP) [22] , [23] , [29] - [31] .
In [24] , multiple arrays have been used to jointly create a region smaller than that of a single array by dividing the transmitted message and sending it out via multiple arrays in a time-division manner, so that only the user within the jointly created region can receive the complete message. This idea was extended in [21] and [25] by encrypting the transmitted message so that only the user within in the jointly created region could decrypt it, with interference sent on some arrays to reduce the effective coverage region. Multiple APs were used in [26] to jointly perform beamforming with adaptive transmit power to reduce the joint physical region.
Whilst multiple arrays provide smaller regions, synchronization of the arrays and modifications to higher layer protocol are problematic [24] . Anand et al. [27] avoid this by using a single array to create a cross-layer design called a STROBE that inserts orthogonal interference which is transmitted simultaneously with the intended data stream, so that Eve cannot decode correctly while Bob remains unaffected by the interference. The work in [28] designed a specific type of smart array that has two synthesized radiation patterns that can alternatively transmit in a time-division manner overlapping in Bob's direction to provide a full signal transmission whilst reducing signal quality to Eve.
The work based on the traditional performance metrics lacks an information-theoretic analysis, although Lakshmanan et al. [21] , [25] , define the ER as a performance metric but not using information-theoretic parameters. Work on insecure and secure regions using the information-theoretic parameters has been undertaken on the compromised secrecy region (CSR) [22] , secrecy outage region (SOR) [23] and vulnerability region (VR) [29] , but defined by the region where a certain security goal is not achieved. On the other hand, the secure regions in [30] and [31] are defined by certain security goal being guaranteed. Despite the difference in the definition of the physical regions, beamforming and/or artificial noise (AN) are used in the work that is based on information-theoretical parameters, either in the form of antenna arrays [23] , [30] , [31] or in the form of distributed antennas [22] , [29] .
Most existing work provides numerical approximations but not the closed-form formulation for these physical regions except for that in [23] and [31] . The closed-form formulation of the physical region or its upper bound in this paper can provide analysis with respect to the related aspects, such as array parameters, which can be potentially used for optimization towards higher level security. In [23] , the Rician fading is averaged and treated as a constant in a very large number of antennas systems. Rayleigh fading generated from simple expressions is considered in [31] , but it is not practical to obtain Bob's CSI or location information without the line-ofsight (LOS) component. It is worth noticing that almost all the reviewed work does not investigate the role of the array parameters in the physical regions. In [13] - [15] , the authors consider some aspect of the array parameters but do not focus on the analysis of the array parameters.
III. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
Consider secure communications in wireless local access network, e.g., Wi-Fi, where the access point (AP), Alice, communicates to a desired receiver (Bob) in presence of passive eavesdroppers (Eves), as shown in Fig. 1 . Suppose that the AP is equipped with an ULA having N antenna elements with a spacing d. In this context, it is the common setting in mobile devices, i.e., Bob and Eves, to have a single antenna due to physical size limitation. Bob and Eves are simply referred to as a 'general user' or a 'user' hereinafter, unless otherwise stated. In this paper, Eves are assumed to be non-collaborative.
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider that the AP is located at the origin point in polar coordinates and a user's coordinates are denoted by z = (d, θ). For ease of mathematical modeling, the ULA is aligned on y-axis with the center at the origin point. The user's angle θ in the polar coordinates is also the angle to the norm of the ULA. Assume that the users are distributed by a homogeneous PPP, e , with density λ e [32] ; Bob's coordinates are denoted by
and ' E ' are used for Bob and Eves hereinafter.
Given z B , the AP transmits data only towards Bob in the presence of l randomly distributed Eves in every transmit time interval. In particular, let x be the modulated symbol with unit power, E[|x| 2 ] = 1, and P t be its transmit power. The transmitted vector, denoted by u, is given by u = √ P t w * x, where w is the beamforming weight vector, i.e., w = s(θ )/ √ N , and s(θ ) is the array steering vector,
where φ i (θ ) is the phase shift on the i -th element and θ ∈ [0, 2π]. For the ULA, substituting (1), we obtain the array steering vector of the ULA,
where k = 2π/λ and λ is the wavelength of the carrier signal [33] . For the 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi signal, λ = 12.5 cm. Note that s(θ ) in (1) is a general expression for any type of array, while (2) is the expression just for the ULA. For example, the expression for a uniform circular array can be obtained by
where R is the radius of the circular array. Given Bob's location information, θ is set to θ B , i.e., w = s(θ B )/ √ N . For a general user at z = (d, θ), denoted by h(z), the channel gain vector between the AP and user at z can be decomposed into LOS and non-LOS (NLOS) components, and is expressed by
where d −β/2 denotes the large-scale path loss at the distance, d, and the path loss exponent β ∈ [2, 6] 
represents the NLOS component where every g i entry is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., g i ∼ CN (0, 1); K denotes the factor of the Rician fading. According to (3), the received signal at z can be obtained by
where n W is the additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ 2 n andh is the equivalent channel factor, which is given bỹ
where (5) is a general expression derived from (1) and is also valid for any type of array. For the ULA, it is given by
Remark 1: The array patterns for G(θ, θ B ) at ±(θ B ± π) are symmetric to each other. Due to this symmetry property of the ULA, it suffices to study
Denoted by γ (z), the received SNR at z, can be found from (4),
The channel capacity of the general user at z can be given by
For convenience, let C B = C(z B ) and C Ei = C(z Ei ) denote the channel capacities of Bob and the i -th Eve hereinafter. Due to the fact that |h| 2 scales with G(θ, θ B ), a proper design of G(θ, θ B ) can improve C B while decreasing C Ei .
IV. EXPOSURE REGION AND SPATIAL SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
From (8), it can be noticed that C Ei relies on random location z Ei and the small-scale fadingh. As a result, one or more Eves could have a higher channel capacity than a certain threshold, leading to the secrecy outage [34] . For given Eves' random locations, the exposure region (ER) is mathematically formulated to characterize the above secrecy outage event. Then the SOP with respect to the ER is evaluated as a measure of the security level. An upper bound expression for the SSOP is derived to facilitate theoretical analysis.
A. Exposure Region
Let R B and R s be the rate of the transmitted codewords and the rate of the confidential information, respectively. As in [34] , we assume the following statements. We differentiate a secrecy outage and a unreliable transmission, i.e., a data outage when C B < R B . In this paper, we only focus on a secrecy outage event, given that C B ≥ R B . Notice that the data outage event, given that C B < R B , is the typical outage with no secrecy and thus no secrecy outage. Accordingly, this data outage is not part of the secrecy outage and is out of our scope. A secrecy outage event occurs when Eve's channel capacity is higher than the difference R B − R s conditioned on C B ≥ R B , and the probability of such an event is the SOP.
The geometric meaning is lacking in the above definition of SOP in [34] . To characterize the secrecy outage event for the PPP distributed Eves, the ER, denoted by , is defined by the geometric region only where Eves cause the secrecy outage event, i.e., C Ei 
can be represented by
The i th Eve will cause secrecy outage, if and only if z Ei ∈ . At the same time, C B ≥ R B needs to be guaranteed. Substituting (8) into (9) and rearranging d and θ , can be transformed into (10) where
D(θ ) is a function only of θ for a given θ B and the contour of . All locations within D(θ ) have C(z) > R B − R s , giving a clear geometric meaning, as shown in Fig. 2 . It can be shown from (11) that D(θ ) (i.e., the shape of ) is mainly determined by |h| 2 . Thus, is a dynamic region with shifting boundary whenever |h| 2 varies. When the channel is deterministic, D(θ ) is also deterministic. It is worth noticing that in Fig. 2 , Bob should be located inside the dashed line, i.e., C B ≥ R B . Since R B and R s are system parameters that are constant, there is a fixed relationship between the dashed line and D(θ ). In this paper, the ER enclosed by D(θ ) is of more interest.
Denoted by A, the quantity of can be measured by the inner area of D(θ ). Using (11) , A in polar coordinates can be expressed by,
A is measured in m 2 and depends on |h| 2 which can be a function of G(θ, θ B ) in the following. Lemma 1: |h| 2 can be decomposed by
where (5), let g be the following substitution.
where 
Then, |h| 2 can be obtained by
A reliable transmission is guaranteed for Bob, if Bob is inside the dashed curve in Fig. 2, i. e., C B > R B . A secrecy outage event only occurs when z Ei ∈ . Intuitively, given that Bob's reliable transmission is guaranteed, the smaller A is, the smaller number of Eves are statistically located in , leading to less occurrence of the secrecy outage.
B. Spatial Secrecy Outage Probability
Any Eve at z Ei ∈ causes C Ei > R B − R s and this is referred to as a spatial secrecy outage (SSO) event with respect to the ER. The spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP) can be defined by the probability that any Eve is located inside .
To the best of our knowledge, the SSOP provides distinctive measure of the ER based security over the conventional SOP which does not have dynamic geometric implication; the SSOP emphasizes the secrecy outage caused by the spatially distributed Eves within a dynamic .
We quantify the SSOP, denoted by p, to measure the secrecy performance. Particularly for given PPP-distributed Eves, the probability that m Eves are located inside (with its area quantity A) is given by
Using (12) and (17), p can be quantitatively measured by referring to 'no secrecy outage' event that no Eves are located inside and is given by
It can be seen from (18) that p decreases along with A and λ e . The smaller p is, the more secure transmission to Bob is. The physical meaning is that a smaller ER or less number of potential Eves lead to less spatial secrecy outage occurrences.
Notice that p in (18) depends on the equivalent channel factorh via A. Due to the fact thath is random channel fading, it is more interesting to study the expectation of p, which reflects the averaged SSOP, which is denoted byp and can be calculated byp
Theorem 1: Given A in (12),p in (19) can be expressed by (20)- (22) , shown at the bottom of the page, where λ e is the density of Eves, c 0 =
is deterministic, β is the path loss exponent, K is the Rician factor and G(θ, θ B ) is the array factor when the DoE angle is Bob's angle θ B . G(θ, θ B ) is a general array factor expression, based on which we can state that the definition ofp applies to any array type.
Proof: First, substituting c 0 into (12), A can be simplified into
Substituting (13) and (24) into (19) ,p can be calculated by (23) , shown at the bottom of the page. For normal distribution,
(20) can be obtained by substituting (25) and (26) into (23) . Take the limit of K → ∞ and K → 0, (21) and (22) can be obtained, respectively. Thus, the proof is completed. It is worth pointing out that for the deterministic channel (K → ∞),p in (21) is mainly decided by G(θ, θ B ) , while for the Rayleigh channel (K = 0),p in (22) is shown not to contain G (θ, θ B ) , as there is no LOS component in Rayleigh fading channel. The termp in Theorem 1 is complex and can be numerically calculated. However, it is not tractable to obtain in closed-form expression, except for the deterministic channel when β = 2. In the next subsection, upper bound expression forp will be derived in closed-form to facilitate detailed theoretical analysis.
C. Upper Bound Expression for Averaged SSOP
To obtain the analytic upper bound expression, consider two major obstacles. First, let X θ = c 0 |h| 2 . A in (12) can be written in terms of X θ as
X θ relies on the array factor G(θ, θ B ). It is not straightforward to solve the integral when β > 2. The other obstacle is that Eh[e −λ e A ] in (19) is not mathematically tractable due to the composite array factor and Rician fading channels. To overcome the aforementioned obstacles, we aim to obtain the moments of |h| 2 . Denoted byp up , the upper bound forp can be obtained via the moments of |h| 2 using two instances of Jensen's Inequality.
where X is a random variable. The equality holds if and only if X is a deterministic value. The other one involved
is expressed by
where X is a random variable and β ≥ 2. The equality holds when β = 2 for any X. Theorem 2: For given λ e and K ,p up can be derived using (28) and (29) and is expressed bȳ
where A 0 denotes the pattern area and is given by,
where J 0 (x) is the Bessel function of the first kind with order zero, and k = 2π/λ is a constant.
Proof: see Appendix A. It is worth mentioning that A 0 in (33) is a general expression to be applied to any type of array, e.g., linear, circular. For the ULA, we can find approximations for the expression of A 0 in (34), because J 0 (x) has a decreasing envelope with the maximum value J 0 (0) = 1 at x = 0, and approaches zero when x increases. This will facilitate the analytical analysis forp up , which in turn provides guidance for the analysis of p, especially ifp up is close top. Notice that for other array types, this method of analyzingp up to obtain an insight of the properties ofp still works. If closed-form expressions, such as in (34), do not exist, appropriate approximations or numerical results can be used based on the particular form of given G(θ, θ B ).
Remark 2: Notice that the inequalities in (28) and (29) are used to derivep up . When K = ∞ and β = 2, the equality holds for both (28) and (29); thus,p up =p. This can be verified by substituting β = 2 into (21) and (31) . Similarly, when K = ∞, the equality holds only for (28); thus,p up is tighter when β = 2 than that when β > 2 according to (29) . When β = 2, the equality holds only for (29) ; thus,p up is tighter for K = ∞ than that for K < ∞ according to (28) . For other cases, the tightness ofp up is not straightforward. The numerical results ofp up for different K and β will be given in Section VI-B.
Remark 3: Bothp in (20)- (22) andp up in (30)-(32) are positively correlated with the transmit power P t via c 0 . It is worth noticing that P t influences the SSOP being independent of the array parameters (N and θ B ) . Therefore, in this paper, when studying the impact of the array parameters, P t is treated as fixed within the constant c 0 .
V. IMPACT OF ULA PARAMETERS ON AVERAGED SSOP
The closed-form expression of A 0 in (34) includes ULA parameters, i.e., N, θ B , d. In this paper, we take the commonly used setting d = 0.5λ as an example and focus on the impact of N and θ B on A 0 and thus the averaged SSOPp. The analyzing method is the same for other values of d, but the results will be different. First, we consider the asymptotic case when K → ∞ and N → ∞. As stated in Remark 2, when K → ∞ and β = 2, we havep up =p. According to (21) and (31), it gives
As seen in (35) 
When d = 0.5λ, (36) can be written as
Using (34) and (37), A 0 can be represented by
When N = 8 and d = 0.5λ, the envelope of the components in (38) is shown in Fig. 3 . In the upper plot of Fig. 3 , J 0 (nπ) is shown to decrease as n. The lower plot depicts the decreasing envelope of A 0,n , i.e., N−n N J 0 (nπ), with n. When n = 1, A 0,1 is the largest; when n = 7, A 0,7 is negligible.
As a result, for given N, we can approximate A 0 by considering the first few dominant terms. Especially in the case when d = 0.5λ, A 0,1 is dominant and it suffices to approximate A 0 using only A 0,1 , i.e.,
Using (35) and (39), when K → ∞,p up can be asymptotically approximated by
where O(·) denotes the big O notation.
From (39) and (40), it can be seen that for any given N,p up increases along with θ B in the range θ B ∈ [0, π/2], because cos(π sin θ B ) decreases from 1 to −1 when θ B increases from 0 to π 2 and J 0 (π) < 0 as illustrated by the upper plot in Fig. 3 . Physically, the main beam width of the array pattern for a ULA with d = 0.5λ increases with θ B ∈ [0, π/2], which leads to an increase in A 0 and thusp up andp. Fig. 4 depicts the impact of θ B on A 0,n andp up . In particular, A 0,n is the components of A 0 , whichp up relies on according to (35) . For the illustrations, we use the ULA with N = 8 and d = 0.5λ. In the left plot, A 0,1 among A 0,n , for n = {1, 2, 3}, has the largest variation from θ B = 0°to θ B = 90°. The variation of A 0,n in θ B ∈ [0, π/2] becomes smaller at larger n.
In the right plot of Fig. 4 , the exactp up is shown in comparison to its various approximations: when n = 1, the approximatedp up in (40) is used, which relies on A 0,1 ; when n = {1, 2}, the approximatedp up in (35) relies on A 0,n in (38), and so forth. It can be seen in Fig. 4 that when n = 1, the approximation already captures the increasing trend of the exact value. With more values of A 0,n , the approximation becomes closer to the exact value.
It is worth noticing from Fig. 4 that A 0,n , for n > 2, is not monotonic in the range θ B ∈ [0, π 2 ]. However, for n > 2, A 0,n , is less dominant than A 0,1 . Overall, the exact value ofp up is depicted to have a monotonic increasing relationship with θ B in general.
B. Impact of N
When N changes, the number of summation terms in (38) as well as its own term envelope |A 0,n |, are also influenced. Therefore, we analyze A 0 with respect to N for a given θ B by obtaining another approximation of A 0 . Let A 0 in (38) have A 0,n = 4π N−n N q n , where {q n } is an series for given θ B and n ∈ N + , i.e.,
Examples of {q n } when d = 0.5λ are illustrated in Fig. 5 . For the three different values of θ B ∈ {0°, 30°, 60°}, it can be seen in Fig. 5 that the behavior of {q n } differs greatly. When
2 ). When N is sufficiently large, N−n N becomes negligible for larger n; q n also approaches zero as n increases, as illustrated in Fig. 5 . In this case, only A 0,n , for n ≤ N up ≤ N −1 needs to be considered. Thus, the asymptotic expression when N → ∞ can be expressed by The particular value of N up , larger than which q n is negligible, is subject to practical requirement. According to (42), we can asymptotically have
where |q n | 1 for n > N up . Fig. 6 depicts the impact of N onp up for various θ B ∈ {0°, 30°, 60°}. It can be seen from this figure that when N increases,p up fluctuates at different rate for different θ B . In addition, it can be observed that for any θ B ,p up approaches to a fixed value when N grows sufficiently large. This validates the asymptotic expression in (42).
VI. SIMULATIONS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulations and numerical results forp andp up of the ER based beamforming over the Rician channel with any K ≥ 0 and β = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} with respect to N and θ B .
A. SSOP and Its Upper Bound
In (30),p up is positively correlated with
For any fixed β and K ,p up also has a positive relationship with A 0 . Thus, the conclusions that are reached about A 0 regarding to the impact of N and θ B also apply tō p up for different β and K .
For convenience, let A 1 denote
When β increases from 2 to 6, A 2 β 1 decreases, because A 1 is generally larger than 1. It is also noticed that when A 0 = 2π, K factor disappears, i.e., A 1 = c 0 . When A 0 < 2π, the larger K is, the smaller A 1 (i.e.,p up ) is; when A 0 > 2π, the larger K is, the larger A 1 (i.e.,p up ) is.
In Fig. 7 , the examples ofp up for different K and β are given for three typical values of A 0 , i.e., 4.1326, The range of K in linear scale is from 0.01 to 50. When K = 0.01, the Rician channel approaches the Rayleigh channel (K = 0). When K = 50, the Rician channel approaches the deterministic channel (K = ∞). It can be seen that for fixed β,p up is a constant for K = 0 and is irrelevant to A 0 (nor N, θ B ), as shown in (22) and (32) . When K > 10,p up approaches to a certain value that depends on A 0 which in turn depends on N and θ B .
The above analysis of the properties ofp up serves as a coarse guidance for that of p. In the following, precise numerical results are used to show the properties ofp, which cannot be easily analyzed according to (20) . First, the simulation results are provided to validate the expressions ofp in (20) to (22) which are derived from the expression in (19) which contains Gaussian random variables via |h 2 | according to (12) and (13) .
We choose K = 10 and β = 3 as an example to compare the numerical results based on the expression in (20) and the simulation results based on the expression in (19) . For the simulations, 1 × 10 4 samples are generated for g Re and g I m in (13) . The simulation and numerical results plotted in Fig. 8 show a good match between them, which verifies the validity of the expressions in (20) to (22) .
An example ofp versus θ B for β = 3 and N = 8 is given in Fig. 9 . β = 3 is a typical value for some indoor scenarios such as home and factory [35] . Typical values of K are chosen as 0, 1, 10 and ∞. In addition,p up is also shown.
It can be seen thatp andp up increase in the range θ B ∈ [0, π 2 ], except for K = 0. When K = 0, the curves are flat becausep andp up are irrelevant to θ B , according to (22) and (32) . By comparingp up andp, it can be observed that the upper bound reflects the trend very well. It can also be seen that for bothp andp up , the curve for K = 10 is closer to that for K = ∞, while the curve for K = 1 is closer to that for K = 0.
For completeness, Fig. 10 shows an example ofp andp up versus N for β = 3 and θ B = 0°. It can be seen thatp andp up decrease to different floor levels depending on K . The same behavior has been shown in Fig. 6 where K = ∞ and β = 2. However, it can also be seen thatp converges with a much slower speed, leading to an increasing larger gap betweenp andp up as N increases.
In summary, the properties of A 0 with respect to N and θ B can be extended top up . As forp, whilep has similar properties to A 0 with respect to N and θ B , the gaps between p andp up increase as N. Therefore, in the next section, the tightness ofp up will be examined. 
B. Tightness of Upper Bound
In this section, the tightness of the upper bound is examined via numerical results with respect to (K , β, N, θ B ). An example ofp andp up for different K and β with N = 8 and θ B = 0°is shown in Fig. 11 . At lower region of K , the channel approaches the Rayleigh channel. Thus,p and p up converge to the certain values that only depend on β according to (22) and (32) . At higher region of K , the channel approaches the deterministic channel.p andp up converge to the certain values that depend on β and G(θ, θ B ), according to (21) and (31) .
It can also be seen that when β = 2, the curves forp andp up emerge as K increases, which corresponds top = p up for the deterministic channel. For other values of β, as K increases, the gaps betweenp andp up increases. In this section, the ratio betweenp up andp is used to measure the tightness ofp up . Let η denote the ratio,
η ≥ 1. The smaller value of η, the tighterp up is. In Fig. 11 , it can be deduced that η will take the minimum value at K = 0 and approach the maximum value at K = ∞. Thus, in the following, the extreme cases K = 0 and K = ∞ are used to study the range of η for different N, θ B and β.
In Fig. 12 , η is plotted against θ B for K = 0 and K = ∞ for all β. The ULA has N = 8 elements and d = 0.5λ. For Rayleigh channel, bothp andp up are irrelevant to θ B , thus η is flat across θ B ∈ [0, 90°]. For the deterministic channel when β = 2, η = 1; when β > 2, η in general decrease with θ B .
Comparing the curves for both the deterministic and the Rayleigh channels, it is noticed that when β > 2, the ratios are located closely in a cluster. However, there does not exist monotonic relationship between η and β. For example, when β = 6, η for the deterministic channel is smaller than that when β = 4.
In Fig. 13 , η is plotted against N for K = {0, ∞} and β ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The ULA has d = 0.5λ and θ B = 0°. For the Rayleigh channel, η is flat across N for all β. For the deterministic channel, η in general increases with N when β > 2, which verifies the observation from Fig. 10 .
In summary, when β = 2, η decreases with K till the minimum value η = 1; when β > 2, η increases with K till certain value that depends on N and θ B , and the values of η for different β stay in a cluster. For given β and K , η generally decreases with θ B and increases with N. In a lower region of N, e.g., N < 10, the value of η is smaller than 2.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated secure wireless communications whereby a ULA in Alice communicates to Bob in the presence of PPP distributed Eves. Particularly, we mathematically defined ER to characterize spatial secrecy outage event and proposed the ER based beamforming over a Rician fading channel. As for the analysis of the ER, the analytic expression of the pattern area was also derived in form of Bessel function and two different approximations were adopted to analyze how Bob's angle and the number of element of the ULA quantify the ER. Using the ER, the SSOP was defined and the SSOP performance was evaluated, allowing the derivation of its exact and upper bound closed-form expressions. The impact of the array parameters on the SSOP was discussed to find that the SSOP increases dramatically with increasing angle of Bob; decreases with reducing ER; and approaches certain level with increasing number of antenna elements. Simulations and the numerical results validated our analysis and examined the tightness of the upper bound expressions. Since the definitions of the ER and the SSOP were generalized to be applicable to any array type, the results can be useful to various antenna array types in future wireless security systems. In this work, we assumed that Eves are non-collaborative. For future work, collaboration between Eves could be investigated.
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APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to (19) and (28) , it can be derived that
Notice that A depends on random variableh and is not constant, except for K = ∞. Thus, the equality holds only for deterministic channels.
To solve (45), assume that θ ∼ U(0, 2π). According to (27) , A in (45) can be converted into
According to (29) , (46) is bounded by
In the inequality, the equality holds when β = 2 for any K . According to (45) and (47), it can be derived that
Then applying (29) and (48), it can be derived that
Exchanging the integral and E |h| , then substituting X θ = c 0 |h| 2 , it can be derived that
Notice that when β = 2, the equality holds. Apply (50) to (45) then obtain
The upper boundp up can be expressed bȳ
According to (13) 
. Substituting the previous result into (52), (30) can be obtained.
For special cases, take the limit of K → ∞ and K → 0, (21) and (22) can be obtained.
For the ULA, (33) can be further derived according to (6) . 
where A 0 is the summation of N ×N terms. To further simplify (54), each of which is denoted by A 0,i, j , Notice that the only variable across all A 0,i, j is the difference i − j . So let n = i − j and it can be derived that
Then, all the values of n that are associated with A 0,n are mapped into a table shown in 
